

Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ARA-06 IO-11 /104 W

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R 171631Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3487

INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

USMISSION UN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BAMAKO 954

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PR, KN, KS, AO, ML

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON PRESIDENT TRAORE

REF: (A) STATE 053709, (B) STATE 052413, (C) STATE 054197

SUMMARY. I CALLED MARCH 12, AT MY REQUEST, ON PRESIDENT TRAORE FOR TOUR D'HORIZON PRIOR TO MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION. I RAISED PUERTO RICO, KOREA, ANGOLA, AID AND USIS ACTIVITIES IN MALI. THE TALK WENT VERY WELL. PRESIDENT AGREED THAT PUERTO RICO WAS INTERNAL AFFAIR OF THE U.S. AND SAID HIS AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN REBUKED FOR NOT UNDERSTANDING MALI'S POSITION (BUT, WE STILL DON'T KNOW HOW THEY WILL VOTE). HIS STATEMENTS ON KOREA SOUNDED LIKE U.S. POSITION BUT WERE DIFFUSE; ON ANGOLA I UNDERLINED OUR CONCERN OVER CUBAN/SOVIET INTERVENTION. DCM ACCOMPANIED. END SUMMARY.

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1. AFTER EXPLAINING THAT I WOULD BE IN THE U.S.

DURING APRIL-MAY ON CONSULTATION AND VACATION, I SAID THAT I WANTED TO RAISE CERTAIN ISSUES WHICH WERE CURRENTLY OF IMPORTANCE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I GAVE A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF PUERTO RICO'S STATUS, THE RESULTS OF PAST ELECTIONS, THE GUARANTEED RIGHTS OF THOSE WHO SOUGHT INDEPENDENCE TO ADVANCE THEIR POINT OF VIEW, AND OUR BELIEF THAT DISCUSSION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PUERTO RICO IN ANY INTERNATIONAL FORUM WAS UNACCEPTABLE INTERFERENCE IN U.S. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.

2. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT A MALIAN DELEGATION HAD GONE TO PUERTO RICO 10-11 YEARS AGO AND HAD REACHED THE SAME CONCLUSION. PUERTO RICO WAS NOT A PROBLEM FOR ANYBODY BUT THE CITIZENS OF PUERTO RICO. THE U.S., IT SEEMED, WAS FOLLOWING THE WISHES OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PUERTO RICAN PEOPLE. THAT WAS HIS POLICY. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PRESIDENT SAID, THERE WERE SOME CIVIL SERVANTS (READ AMBASSADOR KANTE) WHO HAD NOT FOLLOWED HIS POLICY, AND HE HAD INSTRUCTED HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO REMIND THEM THAT IT WAS NOT THE POLICY OF THE PRESIDENT, THE MALIAN GOVERNMENT, NOR THE MALIAN PEOPLE TO QUESTION U.S. SOVEREIGNTY REGARDING PUERTO RICO. HIS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N., SAID THE PRESIDENT FORCEFULLY, HAD BEEN REMINDED WHAT MALI'S POLICY WAS ON THIS MATTER.

3. I THANKED HIM FOR HIS STATEMENT AND ASSURED HIM THAT I WOULD TRANSMIT IT TO WASHINGTON (SEE COMMENT).

4. ON KOREA, I NOTED THAT THE U.S. AND MALI HAD LONG HELD DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE KOREAN PROBLEM. I POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE NORTH KOREAN APPROACH DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF DEALING WITH SOUTH KOREA. THE TWO KOREAS EXISTED, SOUTH KOREA WAS RECOGNIZED BY A MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD, AND ANY APPROACH THAT ATTEMPTED TO IGNORE THIS REALITY COULD NOT HOPE TO SUCCEED. PERHAPS MALI COULD POINT THIS OUT TO THE NORTH KOREANS.

5. THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY WAS LONG, DIFFUSE AND DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. IN EFFECT, HE AGREED. HE SAID MORE
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POSITIVE THINGS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TWO KOREAS SOLVING THEIR OWN PROBLEMS THAN ANY MALIAN OFFICIAL I HAVE YET SPOKEN TO. BUT THE ANALOGIES WERE CONFUSING. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT WEST GERMANY, STRESSING THAT MALI HAD LONG HAD RELATIONS ONLY WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND HAD ONLY RECOGNIZED EAST GERMANY AFTER WEST GERMANY HAD DONE SO. HE SPOKE ALSO OF THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. ACTIONS IN RESOLVING THE KOREAN PROBLEM, AND ADDED

THAT THE U.S. COULD HELP BY MAKING A GESTURE. BUT HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO U.S. TROOPS IN KOREA, NOR DID HE SAY THAT THE KOREANS SHOULD BE FREE FROM FOREIGN INFLUENCE BEFORE THEY ATTEMPTED TO SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. HE DID NOT MENTION REUNIFICATION, BUT REFERRED TO THE DESIRABILITY OF BOTH KOREAS BECOMING MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

6. I THEN SAID THAT ANGOLA WAS AN AREA WHERE WE HELD DIFFERENT VIEWS. THE U.S. HAD NOTHING AGAINST THE MPLA AS SUCH, BUT WE DID OBJECT TO FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AND WISHED TO CONFIRM OUR VIEW THAT THE SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE AN AFRICAN SOLUTION. THE PRESIDENT THEN EXPOUNDED AT LENGTH ON THE GOOD QUALITIES OF AUGUSTINO NETO AND THE MPLA, STATING EMPHATICALLY THAT MARXISM-LENINISM WAS NOT A VIABLE FORCE IN AFRICA. ANGOLA NEEDED THE U.S., AS WELL AS THE USSR, CHINA AND EUROPE, AND SINCE NONE OF THOSE AREAS WAS GOING TO GO TO WAR AGAINST ANOTHER, THERE WAS NO REASON WHY ANGOLA SHOULD NOT DEAL WITH EVERYBODY. I SAID THAT WE HAD EXPRESSED OUR VIEWS FORCEFULLY IN THE PAST ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT THAT WE HAD DONE SO IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND HAD NOT REFERRED TO OUR DIFFERENCES WITH GOM IN PUBLIC. WE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THESE PROBLEMS WITH THE GOM AND WOULD HOPE TO CONTINUE DOING SO. THE PRESIDENT, CHOOSING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, SAID THAT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BAMAKO 0954

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TAGS: PFOR, PR, KN, KS, AO, ML
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON PRESIDENT TRAORE

THE GOM WELCOMED A FRANK, OPEN, AND CONTINUOUS
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE U.S. ON ANY SUBJECT, BUT
THAT HE WAS SURE I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE UNITED STATES
COULD NOT DEAL WITH COUNTRIES LIKE MALI THROUGH PRESSURE.

7. I THEN GAVE A BRIEF RESUME OF USAID'S PRESENT AND
PROJECTED ACTIVITIES IN MALI AND MADE A POINT OF
ASSURING THE PRESIDENT THAT DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING
USAID PROGRAMS HAD BEEN DUE SIMPLY TO OUR OFTEN
COMPLICATED PROCEDURES, AND WERE IN NO WAY A REFLECTION
OF DIFFERENCES ON POLITICAL ISSUES. I NOTED THAT I
HAD BEEN IN KAYES (HIS HOMETOWN) A MONTH AGO, AND THAT
AN AID GROUP (CDO, ETC.) WAS AT PRESENT IN THAT REGION
LOOKING AT POTENTIAL FUTURE PROJECTS. THE PRESIDENT
WAS CLEARLY PLEASED. HE ADDED THAT AMERICAN MISSIONARIES
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HAD LONG BEEN ACTIVE IN KENIEBA AND HAD DONE MARVELOUS
WORK WITH CHILDREN THERE. THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED FAVORABLY
ON A USIS EXHIBIT ON THE THEME OF BLACK AMERICAN HISTORY
CURRENTLY IN BAMAKO, SAYING THAT MALIANS AND AMERICANS
WERE TRULY BROTHERS, FOR MANY AMERICANS WERE BLACK.
THUS, HE SAID, MALI VIEWED THE U.S. DIFFERENTLY FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE HAD ESPECIALLY APPRECIATED
MY REMARKS AT THE OPENING OF THE EXHIBIT (CARRIED ON
RADIO MALI) TO THE EFFECT THAT ALTHOUGH THE U.S. HAD
NOT SOLVED ALL ITS RACIAL PROBLEMS, IT HAD GONE FAR IN
THAT DIRECTION.

8. I ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING HE WISHED ME TO
RAISE ON HIS BEHALF IN WASHINGTON. HE SAID MALI WAS
STILL INTERESTED IN OBTAINING A C-130, BUT THAT THE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE WAS HANDLING THAT. THE PRESIDENT
ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF FMS CREDITS AND SAID
THAT PERHAPS I COULD BEGIN QTE CLARIFY END QTE THAT
POINT IN WASHINGTON. I AGREED TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER
WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTER.

9. COMMENT: THE TALK WENT VERY WELL. THE PRESIDENT WAS RELAXED AND RECEIVED US IN THE CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORM OF A PARATROOP COLONEL WITH NO ADVISORS PRESENT. HE HAD BEEN WELL BRIEFED ON PUERTO RICO, LESS SO ON KOREA (HE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE AWARE OF THE TWO RESOLUTIONS), AND OBVIOUSLY WAS WELL INFORMED ON ANGOLA. ON HIS SIDE, I BELIEVE HE WANTED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE PUERTO RICAN ISSUE IS BEHIND US, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY STATE THAT MALI WOULD NOT VOTE AGAINST US IN THE FUTURE. PERHAPS THE MALIAN POSITION WILL BE CLARIFIED DURING THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE DCM WITH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; PERHAPS THE MAIL IS JUST NOT GETTING THROUGH; OR PERHAPS THE GOM IS HOPING TO AVOID TAKING A POSITION UNTIL FORCED TO DO SO. HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES HIS UNHAPPINESS WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF AMBASSADOR KANTE IN WASHINGTON. (I SHOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT PREVIOUS REPORTS OF GOM UNHAPPINESS WITH KANTE HAVE REFERRED TO HIS SPEECH ON KOREA, NOT PUERTO RICO.) THE THEMES OF FRIENDSHIP AND BROTHERHOOD BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES CAM EASILY AND OFTEN TO HIS LIPS.
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HE SEEMED INTENT ON CONVINCING ME THAT MARXISM-LENINISM, COMMUNISM, AND EVEN SOCIALIS., MEANT LITTLE IN AFRICA. HE ADDED THAT A CONTINUOUS DISCUSSION OF ALL ISSUES WAS GOOD FOR US BOTH. I SHOULD NOTE THAT THE NIGHT BEFORE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, CHARLES SAMBA CISSOHKO, MADE A POINT OF SEEKING ME OUT, REFERRING TO MY DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY GENERAL OF FONOFF, SEYDOU TRAORE (BAMAKO 0586 AND BAMAKO 0592), SAYING THAT ALL MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN U.S. AND MALI (ON MALIAN SIDE) BEGIN QTE HAD BEEN DISSIPATED END QTE. CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT TENDS TO CONFIRM THIS.

I WILL FOLLOW-UP WITH CALLS ON THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND WITH SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS. THE DCM HAS AN APPOINTMENT AT MFA MARCH 19, AND WILL TRY TO PIN DOWN WORKING LEVEL THERE ON SPECIFIC INSTTRUCTIONS MFA WILL SEND TO MALIAN UNDEL REGARDING COMMITTEE OF 24 ACTION ON PUERTO RICO.

I MUST CONFESS TO TOTAL CONFUSION ON THE MALIAN POSITION ON KOREA. THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS COULD WELL BE INTERPRETED AS A REPLAY OF OUR OWN POSITION, BUT, OF COURSE, THE MALIAN POSTURE IN THE U.N. HAS BEEN VERY MUCH AT VARIANCE WITH OURS, AND I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC IT WILL CHANGE. END COMMENT.
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